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EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY IN MISSISSIPPI:




In 1989, in a landmark case, the United States Supreme Court grap-
pled with the intersection of mental retardation and the death penalty.' It
ruled that a capital murder defendant's mental retardation must be consid-
ered as a mitigating factor in sentencing, but did not afford an automatic
exemption from death.3 Thirteen years later the Court changed its mind.
In Atkins v. Virginia' the Justices decided that inflicting capital punishment
on people with mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.' The decision exempts such defendants
from the death penalty.6
If only it were that simple. While it declared the general principle, the
Court explicitly left the details of its application to the states.7 After At-
kins, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided a series of cases in which it
struggled to settle on the proper approach.8 In May 2004, the court handed
down Chase v. State,9 the lead case on mental retardation and the death
penalty in the state.'" Yet, while Chase addresses the Atkins decision, the
definition of mental retardation, and the procedure for Atkins claims,"
questions remain. The court has not been entirely consistent in applying
the law it promulgated in Chase.'2 While it has explained the circum-
stances under which one may get an Atkins hearing,' 3 the court has not yet
1. J.D., Mississippi College School of Law, 2006. The author thanks Professor Matthew Steffey
for his thoughtful help and feedback; and Professor Deborah Challener for her generosity with her time
and for her wise, expert guidance, both in the preparation of this Note and throughout the past three
years.
2. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
3. Id. at 340. Four Justices disagreed with the majority and favored a per se rule against execut-
ing people with mental retardation, arguing that such executions violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
341-50.
4. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
5. Id. at 321.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 317.
8. "Since Atkins, this state has struggled with implementation of that decision." Conner v.
State, 904 So. 2d 105, 105-06 (Miss. 2004).
9. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013 (2004).
10. "[T]his Court today has set forth, in Chase v. State... the tests, standards, and procedures to
be followed in determining the issue of mental retardation." Smith v. State, 877 So. 2d 369, 398 (Miss.
2004) (decided on the same day as Chase).
11. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1023.
12. See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 890 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 2004); Hughes v. State, 892 So. 2d 203 (Miss.
2004).
13. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1023-30.
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detailed what should occur before and during the hearing. Practitioners
have been left wondering about such matters as the scope of discovery and
whether the client is entitled to a neutral, independent expert.
This Note will examine the development of this law beginning with
Penry, Atkins, and the Mississippi Supreme Court cases leading up to
Chase. It will then turn to Chase itself and parse the law as laid out in that
case. Finally, it will investigate how subsequent cases have been decided in
light of Chase, and try to assess the current state of the law and the trend
for the future.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Murder in Mississippi4
Elmer Hart arose on a warm Monday morning in August 1989 to har-
vest vegetables. He drove to town to sell them, leaving his wife Doris
home alone. While Elmer was away, Ricky Chase and Robert Washington
came to rob the Harts. They ended up committing murder.
The Harts, who were both sixty-seven years old, lived near the town of
Hazlehurst, Mississippi, home to Chase and Washington, both twenty. The
Harts knew the Washington family; in fact, on his way into town with his
vegetables Elmer stopped at the Washington residence to talk with Wash-
ington's wife, Terry. Washington was at home at the time, and apparently
Elmer's visit gave him an idea. He went to see his friend Chase.
At Chase's house the pair talked about Elmer Hart, and in Washing-
ton's recounting of these events it was Chase who said that Elmer "had
some money." They decided to take it from him. They drove to the Hart
home in Washington's Camaro. When they arrived, Elmer had not yet re-
turned. Washington attacked Doris when she went outside around eleven
o'clock in the morning. Apparently, Doris did not see Chase at that point.
Washington covered Doris's face with an ammonia-soaked towel, and with
help from Chase tied her up and blindfolded her. They dragged her inside.
Washington and Chase ransacked the house. They did not find the
cash they came for, but they discovered several guns. Presently they suc-
ceeded in terrorizing Doris into revealing that she had $400 in her purse.
Elmer returned home while the robbery was in progress. Finding his
wife bound, alone in the room, he tried to free her from her bonds. As he
did so Chase, who hid in the bathroom with Washington when Elmer ar-
rived, stepped into the room and shot Elmer in the head. 5
The rumors about Elmer carrying large wads of cash proved true-
Chase took $4000 from Elmer's pockets.
14. The facts in this subsection of this Note are taken from the account of the crime in Chase v.
State, 645 So. 2d 829, 836-37 (Miss. 1994).
15. In statements to the police and in testimony at his trial, Chase consistently said that he did
not do the shooting. Chase v. State, 699 So. 2d 521, 529-30 (Miss. 1997).
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After the pair left, Doris managed to kick the restraints off her feet
and go outside where the letter carrier heard her cries for help. He fin-
ished untying her, and then he went into the house and found Elmer's
body.
The police arrived. Their investigation, aided by an eyewitness who
had seen and recognized Washington and his car, quickly led to arrests.
With help from Chase, the police recovered the money and guns, and they
also found Chase's bloody clothing.16 The blood was the same type as
Elmer's.
In statements to police, each man accused the other of pulling the trig-
ger. Ultimately, Washington entered into a plea bargain and received a life
sentence. At Chase's trial he was the state's chief witness. In February
1990, Chase was found guilty of capital murder in Copiah County Circuit
Court and sentenced to death.
B. A Long Journey Through the Criminal Justice System
1. Initial Appeals
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Chase's conviction and sen-
tence on direct appeal.17 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari18 and
rehearing,' 9 and the state supreme court set an execution date.20 Chase
filed motions in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi for a stay of execution and appointment of a lawyer to re-
present him in the federal habeas process.2' The court granted the
motions.22
2. First Application for Post-Conviction Relief
His new attorney, before going to federal court, tried the post-convic-
tion-relief route in the state court system.23 Such a proceeding is governed
by the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act.2 4 The
statute provides a mechanism by which a prisoner may be able to go back
to the trial court to review "objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues
or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have been
raised at trial or on direct appeal. '25 The appellant makes a motion in the
trial court to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment.2 6 In the case of
someone such as Chase who has already had an unsuccessful direct appeal,
16. The police found Washington's bloodless clothes in the same garbage bag with Chase's.
Chase, 645 So. 2d at 837.
17. Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1994).
18. Chase v. Mississippi, 515 U.S. 1123 (1995).
19. Chase v. Mississippi, 515 U.S. 1179 (1995).




24. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1 to 99-39-29 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
25. Id. § 99-39-3(2).
26. Id. § 99-39-5(1)(i).
20061
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the statute requires, first, the filing of an application to the state supreme
court seeking leave to file the motion in the trial court.27 Thus, in July
1996, Chase's lawyer filed an Application for Leave to File Motion to Va-
cate Judgment and Death Sentence.28
In the application for post-conviction relief, Chase raised fourteen is-
sues.29 The first two involved mental retardation. 30 First, Chase contended
that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they did not present evi-
dence of his mental retardation for mitigation during the sentencing
phase.31 Section 99-19-101 of the Mississippi Code,3 2 which governs impo-
sition of the death penalty, contains a list of mitigating factors.33  It
includes:
" "The offense was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. '
34
* "The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substan-
tial domination of another person.
35
* "The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired."36
A diagnosis of mental retardation could inform decisions on any of these
three factors. 37 Also, Penry v. Lynaugh required that a jury deliberating-on
death must be allowed to consider evidence of mental retardation for miti-
38gation purposes.
Before Chase's trial in Copiah County Circuit Court, his lawyers had
persuaded the court to provide funds for a psychiatric examination. 39 The
exam results suggested the possibility that Chase had mental retardation.'
He did not do well on the IQ test.41 The psychiatrist reported that "[t]he
Performance IQ of 64 is in the mildly retarded range, but he did not seem
to be performing at his best on these particular tests .... [H]e was not
27. Id. § 99-39-7.
28. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1016. Justice Dickinson, the author of the majority opinion, pointed out
in a footnote that this motion "is known by various names, including motion for writ of state habeas
corpus, motion to vacate death sentence, and motion for PCR, or post conviction relief." Id. at 1016
n.1.
29. Chase v. State, 699 So. 2d 521, 524-25 (Miss. 1997).
30. Id. at 524.
31. Id. at 527.
32. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
33. Id. § 99-19-101(6).
34. Id. § 99-19-101(6)(b).
35. Id. § 99-19-101(6)(e).
36. Id. § 99-19-101(6)(f).
37. For example, people with mental retardation tend to be susceptible to the influence of au-
thority figures, see, e.g., Ballou v. Booker, 777 F.2d 910, 915 (4th Cir. 1985), which would support a
finding that the factor in § 99-19-101(6)(e) is present.
38. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
39. Chase v. State, 699 So. 2d 521, 527 (Miss. 1997). Ultimately, Chase was tested by two doc-
tors, but the other exam did not touch upon the issue of mental retardation. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The psychiatrist administered the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scales-Revised test,
(WAIS-R). Id.
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concentrating as well [sic] and perhaps just did not feel like putting forth
his best effort."'4 2 Chase's attorneys had not introduced the exam results at
trial nor had they called the psychiatrist to testify.43
The supreme court, ruling on the application to proceed in the trial
court, found no merit in Chase's argument on this issue.4 For one thing, it
did not view the exam results as very strong evidence of mental retarda-
tion.45 Also, it stated that the decision not to introduce the results could
"be seen as a legitimate exercise of trial strategy."
46
While the first issue Chase raised in the application concerned alleg-
edly inadequate representation during the sentencing phase of the trial, the
second assignment of error claimed that trial counsel was remiss in not
introducing that same evidence of mental retardation during the guilt phase
of the trial or at the pre-trial hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress
evidence. 47 The purpose, according to the opinion's recounting of the ap-
plication's list of issues, would have been "to explain Chase's particular
vulnerability to police coercion. "48 The court rejected this assignment of
error as well. It barely discussed mental retardation, instead focusing on
the theory connecting Chase's intellectual limitations to the question of
whether his statements to the police were tainted and therefore inadmissi-
ble.49 The supreme court found nothing improper about the trial court's
admission of the statements.50 Chase had made "an intelligent and know-
ing waiver of his rights," and his statements were voluntary.5 As for the
psychiatric evidence, the court said that since Chase did not attempt an
insanity defense, the exam results were not relevant.52
In August 1997, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Chase's appli-
cation for post-conviction relief.
53
3. Further Appeals
Next Chase sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. He was
turned down in January 2001. 54 The Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision,55
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 529.
45. Id.
46. Id. Earlier in the opinion, the court explained that a decision to reverse a trial judge when
the appellant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel must be made with great deference to that judge.
Id. at 526. Only when it is clear that the attorney's errors were "so serious that counsel was not func-
tioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment... [and] that the deficient perform-
ance prejudiced the defense [so] as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial" will the court reverse. Id. at
525-26.
47. Id. at 529.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 529-30.
50. Id. at 529 (citing Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d 829, 841-42 (Miss. 1994).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 546. The court found no merit in any of the other twelve assignments of error. None of
them involve mental retardation, so they are not discussed in this Note.
54. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Miss. 2004).
55. Chase v. Epps, 74 Fed. Appx. 339 (5th Cir. 2003).
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denying both rehearing and rehearing en banc,56 and the U.S. Supreme
57Court once again denied certiorari.
4. Renewed Hope for Relief: Atkins Intervenes
Chase's next move was prompted by Atkins, which had been handed
down by the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2002. The Mississippi Uniform
Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act ordinarily gives a petitioner one bite
at the apple, so to speak; once the court has considered a motion for relief,
no further petitions under the Act are allowed.58 An exception exists, how-
ever, when "there has been an intervening decision of the Supreme Court
of either the State of Mississippi or the United States which would have
actually adversely affected the outcome of [the petitioner's] conviction or
sentence . . . ."5 In such a situation the prisoner is allowed to file a "suc-
cessive application."60
For Chase, Atkins was just such an intervening decision.6 His attor-
ney filed a Successive Application for Leave to File Motion to Vacate
Death Sentence,62 to which she attached a proposed Motion to Vacate
Death Sentence.63
At this point in the procedural history, things went a bit awry. Prior to
working on this case, Chase's attorney had been involved in post-convic-
tion relief work for Ron Foster, another man on Mississippi's death row.'
Apparently, someone typed up Chase's successive application by using a
document from Foster's case, intending to change the wording where nec-
essary. Unfortunately, the typist failed to make all the required changes.
Sections of the application retained Foster's facts.65 Moreover, the pro-
posed motion was filed without a signature, as was the Certificate of Ser-
vice, and the motion lacked the statutorily required verification.66
These errors did not escape the attention of the lawyers in the Attor-
ney General's office. The state filed a response attacking Chase's succes-
sive application as deficient.67 The court was not amused by the sloppiness
of the paperwork,68 but it nonetheless permitted Chase's attorney to file
amended documents.69
56. Chase v. Epps, 83 Fed. Appx. 673 (5th Cir. 2003).
57. Chase v. Epps, 541 U.S. 1050 (2004).
58. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-27(9) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Miss. 2004).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1017.
64. Id. at 1017-18.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1018-19.
67. Id. 1017.
68. See id. at 1018 n.6 (lamenting the public's low opinion of the legal profession and calling for
"strict and faithful compliance with the ethical and professional responsibilities of those entrusted with
the privilege of practicing law").
69. Id. at 1018. Those documents were a Motion to Amend Successive Application for Leave to
File Motion to Vacate Death Sentence, with an Amended Successive Application and a new Motion to
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On May 20, 2004, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided that Ricky
Chase had proffered enough evidence to deserve an Atkins hearing in the
trial court.7 ° It granted his Successive Application for Leave to File Motion
to Vacate Death Sentence, as Amended.71
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
Penry, Atkins, Chase-these cases provoke passionate responses on all
sides of the debate over the death penalty. This is in keeping with a long
tradition of struggle to implement the Eighth Amendment edict that "cruel
and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted."72
Chief Justice Earl Warren's elegant distillation of the amendment's
guiding principle is well known:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has
the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that
this power be exercised within the limits of civilized stan-
dards.... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.73
A. Penry v. Lynaugh
The problem of how to discern those standards recurs periodically
throughout the cases. In Penry v. Lynaugh the Court's methodology in-
volved first surveying federal and state legislation. 74  "The clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures."75  The Court's second-favorite
source of guidance on society's standards of decency was "data concerning
the actions of sentencing juries."76
In 1989, when the Court decided Penry, the federal government had
recently enacted a ban on executing people with mental retardation.77 So
had the state of Georgia, following a public outcry after one such person
Vacate Death Sentence. Chase also filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and a Motion to
Proceed Without Verification (because of the lack of required verification on the Motion to Vacate
Death Sentence).
70. Id. at 1030.
71. Id. The court also: (1) dismissed Chase's Successive Application for Leave to File Motion to
Vacate Death Sentence (this was the defective one that had been superseded by the amended applica-
tion); (2) granted the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis; (3) granted the Motion to Pro-
ceed Without Verification; and (4) granted the Motion to Amend Successive Application for Leave to
File Motion to Vacate Death Sentence. Id.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
73. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (emphasis added).
74. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989).
75. Id. at 331 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 334 (referring to the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(l) (1988)).
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had been put to death.7 8 Maryland's legislature had passed a bill imple-
menting a ban, although it had not yet become effective.79 Those were the
only statutes in the nation explicitly prohibiting execution of people with
mental retardation, while fourteen states had banned the death penalty en-
tirely."0 The Supreme Court concluded that this evidence failed to estab-
lish a national consensus on the execution of people with retardation.8
Nor was it able to discern a consensus in the behavior of sentencing juries,
since Penry had not offered any such evidence. 82 He had offered public
opinion polls showing widespread disapproval of death as a punishment for
people with mental retardation and an amicus brief by the American Asso-
ciation on Mental Retardation proclaiming that organization's opposi-
tion.83 The Court, however, gave no weight to these forms of evidence. It
focused exclusively on the "objective" evidence of legislation and jury ver-
dicts and decided that no national consensus existed that would warrant
outlawing execution of people with mental retardation.84  But while
SPenry's mental retardation did not afford him an automatic exemption
from the death penalty, the Court held that a sentencer must consider it as
a mitigating factor; the Eighth Amendment required this.8" At Penry's trial
that had not happened, so the Court reversed in part and remanded for
new sentencing proceedings.86
B. Between Penry and Atkins
During the years following Penry, and apparently to some degree in
response to it,87 one state legislature after another enacted bans on execut-
ing people with mental retardation: first Kentucky and Tennessee in 1990;
followed by New Mexico in 1991; and then, within the next three years,
Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, and Kansas.88 Also in the
1990s, New York and Nebraska reinstated the death penalty, but included
78. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-14 (2002). The executed man was Jerome Bowden, who
had been diagnosed with mental retardation at the age of fourteen and who had an IQ of 65, one
indicator of mild mental retardation. Id. No one-including the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles
and the psychologist who served as the state's expert witness-denied that Bowden had mental retarda-
tion. Id.




83. Id. at 334-35.
84. Id. at 331.
85. Id. at 340. The Court wrote, "In sum, mental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a
defendant's culpability for a capital offense. But we cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amend-
ment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry's ability convicted of a capital
offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone. So long as sentencers can consider and
give effect to mitigating evidence of mental retardation in imposing sentence, an individualized deter-
mination whether 'death is the appropriate punishment' can be made in each particular case. While a
national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge reflecting the
'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,' there is insufficient evi-
dence of such a consensus today." Id.
86. Id.
87. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002).
88. Id.
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provisos that no people with mental retardation could be executed.8 9 In
2000 and 2001 six more states enacted bans,90 for a total of sixteen states
with new statutory prohibitions since Penry. Additionally, in Virginia and
Nevada one house of each legislature passed a ban, and both houses in
Texas passed such a bill, but the governor vetoed it.91 Thus, by the time
Atkins v. Virginia92 reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Stevens felt
confident writing, "Much has changed since [Penry]."93
C. Atkins v. Virginia
Daryl Renard Atkins has several things in common with Ricky Chase.
Each is a young African-American man who almost certainly has mental
retardation.94 Each was involved in a brutal murder, each with a partner.95
Each man says the partner did the killing.96 Each had a trial at which the
state's chief witness was the partner, who pled guilty and testified in order
to avoid a possible death sentence. 97 And each is under a sentence of
death that may be vacated depending upon the outcome of a judicial
proceeding.
98
In Atkins, a majority of six justices decided that society's standards of
decency had indeed evolved since 1989. They arrived at that conclusion by
first-as they had in Penry-surveying the legislation described above and
finding that it indicated a consensus among the American people.9 9 Also,
this time the Court gave weight to evidence in the form of opinion polls
and of statements of various organizations, all of which, the Court found,
lent support to the anti-execution argument. 1°°
The objective evidence, the Court said, "did not 'wholly determine'
the controversy, 'for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question."' 10 ' Exercising this right
to decide whether to make new law in accord with the legislative consen-
sus, it found no reason not to.10 2 In so deciding, it did its own analysis of
the issue. It said that people with mental retardation often know right from
wrong and are competent to stand trial, but that their diminished mental
89. Id.
90. South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina. Id. at 315.
91. Id. In his veto proclamation, Governor Perry, George W. Bush's successor, declared the bill
flawed, and in any case unnecessary since Texas, he claimed, did not execute people with mental retar-
dation. Id.
92. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
93. Id. at 314.
94. On Atkins's mental retardation, consult id. at 308-09. On Chase's, consult Chase v. State, 873
So. 2d 1013, 1019-20 (Miss. 2004).
95. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307; Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1015-16.
96. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307; Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1015-16.
97. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 n.1; Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1017.
98. Donna St. George, Update: Killer's Retardation Case Reprised, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, at
C2; Chase, 873 So. 2d 1013.
99. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16.
100. Id. at 316 n.21.
101. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
102. Id. at 321.
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abilities-significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and limitations
in adaptive skills-make them less culpable than people without retarda-
tion.10 3 Because of this lessened culpability, the purposes for which society
imposes capital punishment-retribution and deterrence-are inapplic-
able. 104
The Court's analysis'015 of retribution was as follows: the severity of the
punishment must correspond to the culpability of the punished. Society
reserves death for only the most culpable; ordinary murderers are not sen-
tenced to die. Therefore, since people with mental retardation are by defi-
nition not among the most culpable (their culpability is diminished by
mental retardation), capital punishment cannot be appropriate.
As for deterrence, those with the reduced mental capacity that is char-
acteristic of retardation are less likely to be able to engage in the cognitive
processes that induce people without retardation to control their im-
pulses. 10 6 Therefore, the deterrent effect will not operate. Also, the deter-
rent effect of the death penalty (according to the Court) on people without
mental retardation will not be diminished, since those people will know
that the exemption does not apply to them.
Additionally, people with mental retardation face a heightened risk of
wrongful execution. 0 7 They tend to be prone to false confession.10 8 They
are often unable to assist in their defense.10 9 They are poor witnesses, and
their demeanor can give juries the impression that they lack remorse. 10
This analysis led the Supreme Court to agree with the consensus it
found in the legislative evidence and to rule that the execution of people
with mental retardation offends the Eighth Amendment."'
The only serious disagreement, the majority said," 2 was about "deter-
mining which offenders are in fact retarded.""' 3 At this point the opinion is
somewhat unclear. "Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will
be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders
about whom there is a national consensus.""11 4 Whatever exactly the Court
meant by that sentence, the meaning of the next one is clear: "[W]e leave
103. Id. at 318.
104. Id. at 318-21.
105. This analysis is detailed at id. at 319.
106. The court's analysis of deterrence is explained at id. at 320.




111. Id. at 321.
112. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, registering their disagree-
ment with the principle that executing people with mental retardation is unconstitutional. They called
the opinion "a post hoc rationalization for the majority's subjectively preferred result rather than any
objective effort to ascertain the content of an evolving standard of decency." Id. at 322.
113. Id. at 317.
114. Id.
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to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the con-
stitutional restriction upon [the] execution of sentences."' 15 For Missis-
sippi, which does not have a statute banning the execution of people with
mental retardation, the task of deciding upon appropriate enforcement fell
to the courts.
116
Noting that the state and federal statutes already in effect had similar
but not identical definitions of mental retardation, the Supreme Court did
not actually mandate a specific one. Various diagnostic manuals offer
slightly different criteria for the diagnosis, and the Court quoted two widely
accepted ones in a footnote and seemed to suggest that either is acceptable.
The first comes from the American Association on Mental Retardation
(AAMR):
1 17
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present
functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related
limitations in two or more of the following applicable adap-
tive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social
skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, func-
tional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation
manifests before age 18.118
The Court also quoted the American Psychiatric Association's definition:
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A)
that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive
functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: com-
munication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion
B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C).
Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may
be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological
processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous
system .... "Mild" mental retardation is typically used to
115. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17 (1986)).
116. See Hughes v. State, 892 So. 2d 203, 217 (Miss. 2004) (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). "This created an extremely difficult task for the appellate courts throughout the
Country, particularly since we were provided virtually no guidance from the Atkins Court in determin-
ing the procedure and guidelines for the determination of mental retardation with its resulting exemp-
tion from the death penalty." Id.
117. A footnote erroneously calls the organization "The American Association of Mental Retar-
dation." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
118. Id. at 309 (quoting AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETAR-
DATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)).
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describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately
70.119
D. In the Wake of Atkins
The people whose sentences were potentially affected by Atkins fell
into two categories: those tried and convicted of capital crimes after the
decision, and those already living under a sentence of death at the time.
For the latter group, Atkins meant that it might be time to go back to the
courthouse. The ban was retroactive for persons who had been sentenced
to death but not yet executed.1 20 Those who might be able to marshal a
claim of mental retardation suddenly had renewed hope of avoiding the
executioner.
One of the newly hopeful was Mack Wells, who petitioned the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court for summary vacation of his death sentence or a jury
trial on the issue of mental retardation.'12  In January 2003 the Mississippi
Supreme Court made the first of its decisions under Atkins. It declined to
vacate his sentence but it did grant leave for an Atkins hearing-but with-
out a jury.122 The court remanded Wells's case to the Scott County Circuit
Court, and after a hearing the judge ruled that Wells had mental retarda-
tion. 2 3 He was taken off death row.1
2 4
David Blue had been on Mississippi's death row since his 1993 convic-
tion for murder and rape. 125 In a hearing on March 11, 2003, Special Cir-
cuit Judge Gray Evans resentenced Blue to life without parole. 126 The
state did not dispute that Blue had mental retardation.
127
A few weeks later, Jimmie Mack had an Atkins hearing. 128 He did not
fare as well; the judge ruled that he was not retarded.129 Perhaps the out-
come was affected by Mack's outburst during a recess. Unhappy with the
way the proceedings were going, he blurted out that he wanted to testify.'
30
"'He's steadily calling me mentally retarded,' Mack said of his attorney,
119. Id. (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS IV 41-43 (4th ed. 2000)).
120. Hughes, 892 So. 2d at 217.
121. Wells v. State, No. 1998-DR-01280-SCT, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 743 (Miss. Jan. 30, 2003).
122. Id. at *1.
123. Email from Andrd de Gruy, Esq., Director, Office of Capital Defense Counsel, Jackson,
Miss., to author (Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with author). The author is indebted to Mr. de Gruy for his
assistance in compiling information for this Note about the outcomes of Atkins hearings in Mississippi.
124. Id.
125. Riva Brown, Retarded Man's Life Spared, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Mar. 12, 2003,
at 1A.
126. Id.
127. Id. Said Assistant Attorney General Sonny White, "When [Blue] was first tried ... the
state's witnesses said he was retarded then." He added, though, that "[t]here are no more resentencings
slated where the state is admitting that a death row inmate is retarded." Id.
128. Riva Brown, Death Row Inmate: I'm Not Retarded, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Apr.
2, 2003, at 1A.
129. de Gruy, supra note 123.
130. Riva Brown, Death Row Inmate: I'm Not Retarded, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Apr.
2, 2003, at 1A.
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Charlie Press of San Francisco. 'I'm not mentally retarded.'" 13' Mack's
case featured a troubling history during which he had repeatedly decided to
drop his appeals and then changed his mind.1 32 His attorney told the judge
that Mack preferred execution to being labeled retarded. 133 His case is on
appeal as of this writing.
134
On June 19, 2003, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided that Ronald
Chris Foster was entitled to an Atkins hearing. 135 In that opinion, the court
began to develop its rules for these hearings. The court stated that the
appellant bears the burden of proof.136 The standard of proof is by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 137 The court must apply the definition of
mental retardation announced in Atkins, "especially" the American Psychi-
atric Association's definition. 38 Additionally, the appellant must take the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-II). 3 9 This test is de-
signed to detect malingering, the "'intentional production of false or
grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by ex-
ternal incentives such as... evading criminal prosecution.. . ."'I" Finally,
the court specified that the decision will be made by a judge, not a jury.14 1
In successfully making his case for an Atkins hearing, Foster offered
only a few pieces of evidence, but the majority deemed them sufficient.
142
Primarily, he relied upon a psychological examination. 43 A psychologist
administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales III (WAIS-III), an IQ
test that the U.S. Supreme Court described in Atkins as "the standard in-
strument in the United States for assessing intellectual functioning,"'"
along with several other tests. The doctor determined that Foster's IQ was




134. de Gruy, supra note 123.
135. Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172, 176 (Miss. 2003).
136. Id. at 175.
137. Id.
138. Id. The court gave no indication of what it meant by "especially" or of why it favored the
APA definition over the AAMR one.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 119, at 683). For an interest-
ing discussion of the idea that mental retardation is quite difficult to fake successfully and that, there-
fore, fears of malingering are misplaced, consult Douglas Mossman, M.D., Atkins v. Virginia: A
Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255, 276-77 (2003).
141. Foster, 848 So. 2d at 175.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 174.
144. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002). The footnote continues with a primer on the
WAIS-III test: "The WAIS-IlI is scored by adding together the number of points earned on different
subtests, and using a mathematical formula to convert this raw score into a scaled score. The test
measures an intelligence range from 45 to 155. The mean score of the test is 100, which means that a
person receiving a score of 100 is considered to have an average level of cognitive functioning." ld.
(citing ALAN S. KAUFMAN & ELIZABETH 0. LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-III ASSESSMENT
60 (1999)).
145. Foster, 848 So. 2d at 174.
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however, that IQ score alone is insufficient to establish mental retarda-
tion. 146 Foster also proffered the affidavit of his sister, who told of testing
in elementary school that resulted in Foster taking special education
classes.
147
The state tried to counter with the results of an IQ test that it said had
been done at Mississippi State Hospital in 1990.148 Purportedly Foster had
tested at eighty.149 Oddly, while this test result had been cited numerous
times, including "by this [the Mississippi Supreme] Court, by the United
States District Court, by the United States Court of Appeals, and by Foster
himself in pleadings before this Court," 150 no one could find such a test
result in Foster's records. 15' The court called it a "mystery.' '1 52
The majority found the quantity and quality of the evidence-the psy-
chological evaluation and the information his sister furnished-sufficient to
earn Foster an Atkins hearing. 153 Presiding Justice Smith dissented. 5 4 He
thought that Foster had not provided enough proof according to the guide-
lines in Atkins. 155 He also said that Foster's motion for relief was procedur-
ally barred.156  He regarded Atkins as an intervening decision, but he
considered the issue of mental retardation to have been "thoroughly pur-
sued at trial level, initial appeal, and on a prior post-conviction relief peti-
tion . . "157 Post-conviction relief is, by statute, confined to facts that
could not have been known at the time of judgment, Justice Smith wrote. 158
The Mississippi Supreme Court decided Willie Russell's application on
the same day as Ron Foster's.159 In an opinion that runs longer than fifty
pages in the reporter, the court denied all of Russell's motions except for
the Atkins claim. 6 ° It granted a hearing in the Sunflower County Circuit
Court on the issue of mental retardation.' 6 1 The court prescribed the same
rules for the hearing as in Foster-use of the Atkins definitions of retarda-
tion, burden of proof on appellant, and preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard of proof.1 62 It also reiterated the no-jury rule.'6 3
146. Id. at 175.
147. Id. at 174-175.
148. Id. at 175. Mississippi State Hospital is the publicly-funded psychiatric facility at Whitfield.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 175.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 175-76. That hearing, however, will not take place, because the U.S. Supreme Court
decided in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that offenders who were not yet eighteen when they
committed their crimes are exempt from the death penalty. Foster was seventeen.





159. Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 2003).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 148-49.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 149.
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In arguing that Russell should get a jury and that the standard of proof
should be beyond a reasonable doubt,164 Clive Stafford Smith, Russell's
attorney, invoked the then-recently decided U.S. Supreme Court cases Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey1 65 and Ring v. Arizona.1 6 6 Those cases concerned sen-
tencing by judges rather than juries. Apprendi had pled guilty to firearms
charges.6 7 The judge then increased the defendant's prison term under a
provision allowing enhanced sentences for hate crimes. 168 The Supreme
Court found this unconstitutional.1 69 Due process and the Sixth Amend-
ment require that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' 17 0 The Court con-
cluded, however, that the principle did not apply to capital cases.
1 7 1
Two years later the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Ring.1 72 Ari-
zona's sentencing scheme allowed a judge rather than a jury to make find-
ings on aggravating factors in a death penalty sentencing proceeding.1
73
The Court ruled this process invalid in light of Apprendi.174 A defendant
who wanted a jury as finder of fact was entitled to one. 1 75 Unfortunately
for Russell and others seeking to have juries hear their Atkins claims, the
Mississippi Supreme Court decided that Ring was inapposite, because "not
being mentally retarded is not an aggravating factor necessary for imposi-
tion of the death penalty."'17 6 Thus, no juries will consider Atkins claims in
Mississippi.
Later in the summer of 2003, the court ruled on the last of the pre-
Chase petitions for post-conviction relief under Atkins.177 Howard Goodin
"produced enough evidence to be granted leave to proceed in the trial
court on the issue of his mental retardation.' 17 The court again rejected
an Apprendi/Ring argument for a jury and reiterated the rules it had an-
nounced in the previous three cases. 179 After the hearing in Newton
County Circuit Court, the judge denied relief and the case is once again on
appeal.
8 0
164. Id. at 146.
165. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
166. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
167. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70.
168. Id. at 470-71.
169. Id. at 497.
170. Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
171. Id. at 496-97.
172. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
173. Id. at 588.
174. Id. at 609.
175. Id.
176. Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 148 (Miss. 2003).
177. Goodin v. State, 856 So. 2d 267 (Miss. 2003).
178. Id. at 277.
179. Id. at 276.
180. de Gruy, supra note 123.
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E. Mississippi Decisions Contemporaneous with Chase
On the same day as the Chase decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court
handed down rulings in the cases of three other applicants seeking post-
conviction relief under Atkins: Carr v. State,181 Neal v. State,'82 and Smith v.
Statet' 3-all remanded to the trial court for hearings. In these three cases
the court began referring to the "new standards set forth today in Chase v.
State,"'" "the criteria of Atkins and Chase,"'8 5 and the fact that "this Court
today has set forth, in Chase v. State... the tests, standards, and procedures
to be followed in determining the issue of mental retardation."' 86
F. Mississippi Decisions After Chase
Between May 20, 2004, the date of Chase, and this writing in March
2005, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided thirteen appeals involving At-
kins claims.' 87 Two of these cases, Wiley v. State'88 and Hughes v. State,189
are particularly interesting for the light they shed on the development of
the rules for Atkins hearings in Mississippi and on the Mississippi Supreme
Court's construction of Chase. In each case, the court denied the applica-
tion for post-conviction relief, deciding, based on the record, briefs, and
oral argument, that the applicant did not have mental retardation." 0 In
neither case was an evidentiary hearing held.' 9 ' In each case, a separate
181. Carr v. State, 873 So. 2d 991 (Miss. 2004).
182. Neal v. State, 873 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 2004).
183. Smith v. State, 877 So. 2d 369 (Miss. 2004).
184. Neal, 873 So. 2d at 1012.
185. Carr, 873 So. 2d at 1007.
186. Smith, 877 So. 2d at 398.
187. Branch v. State, 882 So. 2d 36 (Miss. 2004) (conviction and sentence affirmed on direct ap-
peal); Snow v. State, 875 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 2004) (successive application for leave to seek post-convic-
tion relief in the trial court on the issue of mental retardation granted); Scott v. State, 878 So. 2d 933
(Miss. 2004) (conviction and sentence affirmed on direct appeal); Conner v. State, No. 2003-DR-01337-
SCT, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 692 (Miss. June 17, 2004) (leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court
on the issue of mental retardation denied. Subsequently a rehearing was granted and this opinion was
withdrawn; infra this note); Brown v. State, 875 So. 2d 202 (Miss. 2004) (successive application for leave
to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court on the issue of mental retardation granted); Berry v.
State, 882 So. 2d 157 (Miss. 2004), reh'g denied, No. 2002-DR-00301-SCT, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1207
(Miss. Sept. 30, 2004) (leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court on the issue of mental
retardation denied); Bishop v. State, 882 So. 2d 135 (Miss. 2004), reh'g denied, No. 2002-DR-00932-
SCT, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1295 (Miss. Sept. 23, 2004) (leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial
court on the issue of mental retardation denied); Doss v. State, 881 So. 2d 176 (Miss. 2004) (leave to
seek post-conviction relief in the trial court on the issue of mental retardation granted); Mitchell v.
State, 886 So. 2d 704 (Miss. 2004) (application for leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court
on the issue of mental retardation (among other issues) denied); Wiley v. State, 890 So. 2d 892 (Miss.
2004) (successive application for leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court on the issue of
mental retardation denied); Gray v. State, 887 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 2004) (application for leave to seek
post-conviction relief in the trial court on the issue of mental retardation (among other issues) denied);
Conner v. State, 904 So. 2d 105 (Miss. 2004) (successive application for leave to seek post-conviction
relief in the trial court on the issue of mental retardation granted); Hughes v. State, 892 So. 2d 203
(Miss. 2004) (application for leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court on the issue of mental
retardation (among other issues) denied.)
188. Wiley v. State, 890 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 2004).
189. Hughes v. State, 892 So. 2d 203 (Miss. 2004).
.190. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 894-99; Hughes 892 So. 2d at 213-16.
191. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 894-99; Hughes 892 So. 2d at 213-16.
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opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the majority
was abandoning the rules set forth in the court's earlier decisions on Atkins
hearings, especially Chase v. State. 92
IV. INSTANT CASE
Justice Dickinson wrote the majority opinion in Chase,'9 3 in which
Chief Justice Smith, Presiding Justices Waller and Cobb, and Justices Carl-
son, Graves, and Randolph concurred.194 Justice Easley specially con-
curred with a separate written opinion.'95 Justice Diaz did not
participate. 96
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Background
In Part I of the opinion, Justice Dickinson began with a brief recital of
the facts and a longer recounting of the procedural history. 197 He ex-
plained the one-bite-at-the-apple rule in the post-conviction relief stat-
ute1 98 and the exception for intervening decisions. 9 9 He acknowledged
that Atkins was an intervening decision within the meaning of the statute,
so Chase's successive application was not procedurally barred.2°°
2. Chase's Documents
Part II of the opinion analyzed the Successive Application for Relief,
the Motion to Amend the Successive Application, and the state's response
to those documents-all filed with the Mississippi Supreme Court at the
beginning of the post-conviction relief proceeding-and the arguments on
both sides.2 ' The court summarized Chase's argument-"that Chase is
mentally retarded and, therefore, exempt from the death penalty. 20  It
said that "[t]he state is aggressively opposed to both Chase's Successive
Application, and his proposed motion, for several reasons. '20 3 The first of
these reasons was discussed in Part II § 1, "Deficiencies in the Successive
Application. 2 °4 They were "numerous," the state alleged.20 5
192. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 898-900; Hughes, 892 So. 2d at 216-22. Presiding Justice Cobb wrote the
concurrence/dissent in Wiley, in which Justice Dickinson, the author of the majority opinion in Chase,
joined. Justice Dickinson wrote the concurrence/dissent in Hughes, in which Presiding Justice Cobb
joined.
193. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Miss. 2004).
194. Id. at 1030.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1015-17.
198. MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-27(9) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
199. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1016.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1017-23.
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First, as discussed above,2 °6 Chase's proposed motion (i.e., the motion
he would present to the trial court upon approval of his application to the
supreme court) contained facts from the Foster case.2 7 The response from
the Attorney General's office attacked the motion and the application as
deficient, positing that Chase's attorney had recycled an old application
and substituted Chase's name for Foster's-or tried to, at least.2 °8 The
state alleged that "none of the factual information contained in this pro-
posed motion relates to Ricky Chase-it is all copied verbatim from the
Foster memorandum.
20 9
Chase's lawyer, upon realizing the error, l0 filed a Motion to Amend
Successive Application for Leave to File for Post-Conviction Relief.21' She
argued that "the amendment will not prejudice the State, and that the
amendment is necessary in the interest of justice to correctly state the facts
on which Chase relies in his Atkins claim. ' 212 The court's response was
short and, to Chase's attorney, undoubtedly sweet: "We agree." '213
Next the court discussed the other problems with Chase's application
and motion. The state had alleged that the application did not comply with
the requirements of section 99-39-11(3) of the Mississippi Code, which, the
state said, required that the successive application "be verified by the oath
of the prisoner. "214 This time it was the state's turn to wipe egg off its face.
As the court pointed out, that subsection of the code contains no verifica-
tion requirement for applications for leave to proceed in the trial court.215
No section of the code does. 216 What is required, however, is verification
of the Motion to Vacate Death Sentence.217 Chase's motion lacked
verification.218
The court, while deploring these oversights as "inexcusable particu-
larly in a death penalty case," nevertheless excused them.219 Citing Puckett
206. Supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
207. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1017.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. The state's response to the application and motion informed Chase's attorney of the prob-
lem. Justice Dickinson indulged in a bit of sarcasm in explaining this: "Apparently, after studying the
State's allegations for approximately six weeks, counsel for Chase found them to be meritorious." Id. at
1018.
211. Id.
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Chase's lawyer offered what the court called an "at-
tempted explanation" for the errors in the documents. She "claim[ed] that she had not had significant
involvement in Chase's case prior to filing the motion." Id. The state took issue with that statement.
Id. At that point, the court issued the admonishment described supra in note 68. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. The code subsection in question reads in its entirety, "If the motion is not dismissed
under subsection (2) of this section, the judge shall order the state to file an answer or other pleading
within the period of time fixed by the court or to take such other action as the judge deems appropri-
ate." Miss. CODE. ANN. 99-39-11(3) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
216. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1018.
217. Id. The court pointed out that this requirement is in § 99-39-9(3). Id.
218. Id. The documents contained two other errors: the Certificate of Service lacked a signature,
as did the original Motion to Vacate Death Sentence. Id.
219. Id. at 1019.
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v. State220 for the rule that considerations of due process and fairness re-
quire that a party not be disadvantaged by circumstances clearly beyond his
or her control, the court decided to ignore the errors in the documents and
evaluate them on their merits.2 21
3. Chase's Evidence
After another, somewhat longer summary of Chase's argument that he
had mental retardation and was therefore exempt from the death pen-
alty,222 the opinion turned to the affidavit of Dr. Mark Webb. 23 Webb had
reviewed Chase's medical records, including results of a psychological
exam done by Dr. John Perry.2 4 Webb discussed the results of the Wes-
chler IQ test Perry administered and concluded that Chase suffers from
mild mental retardation. 225 He also determined that:
* "Chase would be easily swayed by persons in authority. "226
* "Chase's disabilities would call into question the veracity of any
statement that Chase made under stress.
227
* "Chase's disabilities would call into question his ability to make a
knowing and voluntary statement.
228
Webb concluded that, to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, fur-
ther evaluation of Chase was necessary. 229 He would have to interview
Chase, do more research, and review the medical and psychological
records.2 30
4. The State's Response
In response, the state argued first that Chase had not put forth enough
to get his case remanded.231 It relied on Johnson v. State,2 32 in which the
Mississippi Supreme Court had denied the appeal of a condemned man
who had claimed that he was insane and who had supported his motion
with affidavits of a psychiatrist and a psychologist.233 The court had found
that the affidavits were insufficient to establish the claim of insanity. 234 It
220. Puckett v. State, 834 So. 2d 676 (Miss. 2002).
221. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1019.
222. Id.
223. Id. Once again the court found it necessary to go on a short excursus because of another
error in Chase's documents. The affidavit made the claim that Webb had been involved in Chase's case
during the first post-conviction relief proceeding. Id. while the court concluded that this statement
was not true, it was "harmless" since it did "not affect Chase's substantive argument." Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1019.






232. Johnson v. State, 508 So. 2d 1126 (Miss. 1987).
233. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1020.
234. Id.
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distinguished Johnson by pointing out that it involved not mental retarda-
tion but rather insanity, the law on which was well established when John-
son brought his appeal.235 By contrast, the law on mental retardation was
in flux, and Chase and his lawyers could not have known of the Atkins rule
at the time of his trial.236 Thus, Johnson was inapposite.237
Next the court considered the state's argument concerning Webb's af-
fidavit. The state questioned its-and Webb's-credibility, enumerating
what it considered deficiencies. 238 The court, however, stated the principle
that the purpose of the instant proceeding "is to determine whether Chase
is entitled to a hearing, rather than to weigh the credibility of evidence to
be presented at that hearing. '239 This was because, the court explained,
Chase's trial occurred at a time when he could not have known of the rule
of Atkins nor of the procedure one must follow to be declared mentally
retarded. 240 Due process, the court said, required that it allow Chase to file
his motion in the trial court and to "fully present to the trial judge [his]
evidence as required by Atkins."
24'
Paragraph 30 of the opinion discussed a provision in the post-convic-
tion relief statute that gives the court the power to "grant or deny any or all
relief requested in the attached motion. '24 2 In the supreme court's view,
this provision gave it "authority to decide the merits of a successive appli-
cation and a motion for post-conviction relief. '243 It decided that in this
case, at least, due process required that it refrain from doing 80.244
5. Chase's Claim of Mental Retardation
Then the court analyzed the state's attack on Chase's claim that he had
mental retardation, dividing it into three sections corresponding to the
three elements of the APA definition of mental retardation.245
246 TesaecnCriterion A is subaverage intellectual functioning.- Te state con
ceded that Chase's IQ of seventy-one indicated possible mental retarda-
tion, but it argued that IQ by itself is not dispositive.247 The opinion
explained that the state was indeed correct, that one prong of the test for
mental retardation requires that the subject's IQ be seventy-five or lower,
but that evaluation of both IQ and adaptive functioning are necessary.248




238. Id. For a discussion of these alleged deficiencies, consult infra Part V.
239. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1020.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1021.
242. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-27(7) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
243. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1020.
244. Id. at 1021.
245. Id. For the APA definition consult supra text accompanying note 119.
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stated that Chase 'did not seem to be performing his best' on the tests, the
State offers no argument to rebut Chase's claim that his ... IQ of 71 indi-
cates subaverage intellectual functioning, and is within the range which can
indicate mental retardation. "249
Criterion B is significant limitations in adaptive functioning.250 The
court cited Atkins for the requirement of significant limitations in adaptive
functioning in at least two skill areas.2 5' The state, "launch[ing] its most
passionate attack,, 252 contended that Webb's affidavit was "totally con-
clusory '253 and "not of the quality or kind useful in this case"'2 54 because
while the doctor stated that Chase had "a deficiency in adaptive behavior,"
he "fail[ed] to identify from the specific adaptive behaviors listed in At-
kins[ ] any single specific area (much less two specific areas, as required by
Atkins) of deficiency. "255 Also, the state cited the opinions of the psychia-
trist and the psychologist in Chase's direct appeal, which the court summa-
rized as follows: "neither doctor specifically found Chase to be mentally
retarded." '256
The state tried to reinforce these contentions with "a great deal of
what it characterizes as evidence that Chase is not deficient in adaptive
functioning. 2 57 This evidence included portions of Chase's testimony at
various hearings, which the state said showed that he "speaks and reasons
too well to be mentally retarded. '2 58 Also, he did not take special educa-
tion classes, nor did he ever fail a grade in school.259 He was a football
quarterback and a certified welder.26 0 He could cook, do yard work, and
wash cars.2 6 1 He had a girlfriend and normal social skills, according to the
state. 62 The lawyers from the Attorney General's office argued that the
picture they painted with these facts did not portray a man with the limita-
tions of adaptive functioning indicative of mental retardation. 63
The justices ruled that these arguments would be germane-even
"persuasive and interesting"-at an Atkins hearing in the trial court, but
that the purpose of the instant proceeding was merely to determine
whether that hearing should occur.E6
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002)).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1022.
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Criterion C is manifestation of mental retardation before age eigh-
teen.265 The state pointed out that Dr. Webb had not weighed in on that
issue.266 The court's brief response to that argument, in its entirety, was as
follows: "We agree that the failure to provide evidence that mental retarda-
tion manifested prior to age eighteen would be fatal to Chase's Motion to
Vacate Death Penalty. '267 Evidently, the court considered this a matter to
be decided by the trial court at the hearing.
6. The Real Issue Before the Court
Having dealt with the state's argument against allowing an Atkins
hearing, the court next clarified the issue before it. 268 "It is not our func-
tion to determine whether Chase is mentally retarded. ' 269 Rather, the pur-
pose of the proceeding was simply to decide whether to allow him to go to
the trial court for relief under Atkins.27 ° The court said that it would so
allow, and explained why. 71
First, Chase could not have known at the time of his trial that a finding
of mental retardation would exempt him from the death penalty.272 Fur-
ther, Chase was part of a small universe of appellants who filed motions for
Atkins hearings "prior to receiving procedural guidance from this
Court. 2 7 3 Therefore, the court concluded,
because he has arguably demonstrated that his IQ falls
within the range of possible mental retardation, and because
he has presented an affidavit which asserts that he suffers
from "mild retardation," we cannot constitutionally deny
Chase the opportunity to present the issue to the trial court.
It is at the trial court that all of the arguments presented by
the State will be weighed along with other evidence
presented, and a final determination will then be made as to
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7. The Implementation of Atkins in Mississippi
In Part III of the opinion, the court provided its official guidance to
counsel and courts on applying the principles of Atkins. 75 It said it in-
tended to address the definition of mental retardation and the procedure
for Atkins claims.276
It began by analyzing Atkins.2 7 7 Anyone who has not read the Atkins
opinion would find in Justice Dickinson's straightforward summary a useful
primer on this law. It began with a discussion of the underlying Eighth
Amendment rationale278 and then explained the method the U.S. Supreme
Court used to determine society's evolving standards of decency.279 It de-
scribed how the Court undertook its own analysis to see whether it agreed
with the legislative consensus.2 8 ° It mentioned the dissents.281
Then the opinion discussed the "scope of Atkins," which, it said, upon
a careful reading of the majority and the dissenting opinions is clearly "that
Atkins exempts all mentally retarded persons-even those who are mini-
mally mentally retarded-from execution .... 282 The court devoted six
paragraphs 283 to a thoughtful parsing of this language, reiterating that "the
Atkins majority intended to grant the Eighth Amendment exemption to
even the most marginally mentally retarded persons, regardless of degree
",284
The court then turned to the definition of mental retardation to be
used in Mississippi. 285 It rehearsed the two definitions in Atkins286 and said
that it had previously approved them in Foster v. State.287 Foster had also
established that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-
11)288 must be administered to detect malingering.2 89 These were to be the
standards for determining mental retardation in the courts of Mississippi, a
determination that was to be made by trial judges by a preponderance of
the evidence.290
The court wrapped up this part of the opinion with a nine-paragraph
discussion of the procedure for Atkins claims.2 9' The procedure differs
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1023-27.
278. Id. at 1024.
279. Id. at 1024-25.
280. Id. at 1026.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1026-27.
284. Id. at 1027.
285. Id. at 1027-28.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1028. For a discussion of Foster, consult supra notes 135-58 and accompanying text.
288. On the MMPI, consult supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
289. Chase, 873 So. 2d at 1028.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1029-30.
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somewhat for people sentenced before this opinion was handed down com-
pared to those whose trials occurred after, although the essence is the
same.
292
To get an Atkins hearing, a defendant in the latter group (not sen-
tenced before Chase) must file with the trial court a motion seeking the
hearing.2 93 The motion must be filed before the deadline set by the trial
court.2 94 The motion must be accompanied by an affidavit from a licensed
psychologist or psychiatrist qualified to diagnose mental retardation and to
administer and interpret the tests used in such an evaluation, who must
state, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that:
* "the defendant has a combined [IQ] of 75 or below, and;"
" "in the opinion of the expert, there is a reasonable basis to believe
that, upon further testing, the defendant will be found to be men-
tally retarded, as defined herein."2 95
The state can file a response to the motion.296 The trial court is to allow a
reasonable time for testing the appellant, and then schedule the hearing.297
For those sentenced before Chase the procedure is similar, except that
the expert's affidavit must be attached to the application for post-convic-
tion relief.2 98 The application will then be considered using the rules set
forth in the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act.299
At the hearing, to meet the initial burden of going forward, a member
of either group must produce an expert with the same qualifications as the
expert whose affidavit is required to get the hearing in the first place.3 °°
This expert must state, "to a reasonable degree of certainty,"3 0 ' that:
* "The defendant is mentally retarded, as that term is defined by the
American Association on Mental Retardation and/or The Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association;" and
* "The defendant has completed the Minnesota Multiphasic Person-
ality Inventory-I (MMPI-II) and/or other similar tests, and the de-
fendant is not malingering. "302
If the appellant meets this initial requirement, he or she may then of-
fer other opinions and evidence according to the Mississippi Rules of Evi-
dence.30 3 The state may also offer evidence. 30 4 Then "the matter should
proceed as other evidentiary hearings on motions. '30 5 After the hearing
292. See id.
293. Id. at 1029.
294. Id.
295. Id. (footnote omitted).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1029-30.
299. Id. at 1030 (referring to Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1 through 99-39-29 (2002 & Supp. 2004)).
300. Id. at 1029. On those qualifications, consult supra text accompanying note 293.
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concludes, the judge must rule on the question of mental retardation.
30 6
The judge's decision, the court decreed, must be based on two factors:
" "the expert opinions offered by the parties, and"
• "other evidence [o]f limitations, or lack thereof, in the adaptive
skill areas listed in the definitions of mental retardation approved
in Atkins .... 307
The trial court then must enter its finding and the factual basis for it in the
record.3 °8
Then followed a short, two-paragraph statement that Chase has
"presented the bare minimum necessary under the circumstances, and is
entitled to proceed to a hearing in the trial court on this issue [of mental
retardation]. 30 9 Those "unusual and limited circumstances 3 a0 included
the fact that he was convicted before Atkins and that he could not have
known of the procedural requirements the court laid out in this opinion.311
Because of that lack of notice, the court found that Chase's showing in this
case was sufficient.312
B. Justice Easley's Special Concurrence
Justice Easley agreed that Chase should get a hearing,31 3 but he
wanted to add a procedural requirement for all future Atkins proceed-
ings.3 14 He would require that the trial judge enter into the record her
findings on each of seven factors that Justice Easley identified as the guide-
lines for the judge's decision.3" 5 This requirement would be for the pur-
pose of "clarity."3"6 It would facilitate the trial court's decision making;
help avoid confusion on appeal; and aid parties and their counsel in under-
standing the requirements of Atkins/Chase.1 7
V. ANALYSIS
Atkins v. Virginia is a landmark decision; it announced a new rule of








313. Id. (Easley, J., concurring).
314. Id. (Easley, J., concurring).
315. Id. at 1030-31 (Easley, J., concurring). Those seven factors are (1) whether the defendant
filed the required affidavit of an expert stating that the defendant's IQ is seventy-five or lower and that
further testing should confirm mental retardation; (2) whether the defendant has mental retardation
according to the Atkins definition; (3) whether the defendant has the limitations in adaptive skills re-
quired by the definitions of mental retardation; (4) whether the mental retardation manifested before
age eighteen; (5) whether the defendant has subaverage intellectual functioning; (6) whether the defen-
dant has taken the MMPI-II or similar test; and (7) whether an appropriately qualified expert rendered
an opinion that the defendant has mental retardation. Id.
316. Id. at 1031 (Easley, J., concurring).
317. Id. (Easley, J., concurring).
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with mental retardation is something that Americans, in recognition of so-
ciety's evolving standards of decency, will not do. Others deplore it, believ-
ing that the purposes for which they support capital punishment will not be
served by exempting any guilty person. Yet it is the law of the land. Ex-
actly what effect it will have on the real-world administration of justice in
the United States and in Mississippi, however, remains to be seen.
In Mississippi, during the thirty-two months between the Atkins deci-
sion and this writing, two condemned men, Mac Wells and David Blue,
successfully pressed Atkins claims and left death row.31 Two others, How-
ard Goodin and Jimmie Mack, had hearings after which the trial court
judges denied relief; those cases are on appeal.319 Ricky Chase and eight
others are awaiting hearings after successful applications to the Mississippi
Supreme Court. 320 Ron Foster left death row because of Roper v. Sim-
mons,3 2 1 the March 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision that outlawed the
execution of those not yet eighteen at the time of their crimes. And eight
men appealing death sentences have been denied Atkins hearings.322
In Chase, the supreme court stated that the purpose of the proceedings
was "to determine whether Chase is entitled to a hearing, rather than to
weigh the credibility of evidence to be presented at that hearing., 323 Any-
one who reads that passage and paragraph 31 of the opinion-"Here, we
find that due process requires us to allow the motion to be filed in the trial
court, enabling Chase and the State to fully present to the trial judge evi-
dence as required by Atkins"3242-should be forgiven for concluding that
the rules for these post-conviction relief proceedings require that a trial
court decide whether the applicant has mental retardation. "As required
by Atkins";325 what else could that mean?
Of course, Justice Dickinson was careful to include paragraph 30 as
well, stating that the post-conviction relief statute empowers the supreme
court in its discretion to decide applications and motions on their merits
and deny relief.3 26 That is what happened in Wiley v. State327 and Hughes v.
State,3 28 the next cases in this analysis.
318. de Gruy, supra note 123.
319. de Gruy, supra note 123.
320. de Gruy, supra note 123. Those eight men are Anthony Carr, Ronnie Conner, Anthony
Doss, Howard Neal, Willie Russell, Clyde Smith, Eric Snow, and Sherwood Brown. de Gruy, supra note
123.
321. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
322. William Wiley, William Hughes, Lawrence Branch, Kevin Scott, Earl Berry, Dale Bishop,
William Mitchell, and Rodney Gray. Supra note 187.
323. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (2004).
324. Id. at 1021.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1020-21.
327. Wiley v. State, 890 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 2004).
328. Hughes v. State, 892 So. 2d 203 (Miss. 2004).
[VOL. 25:221
2006] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND MENTAL RETARDATION 247
A. Wiley v. State
William Wiley was sentenced to death in 1982 for murder.329 Thus
began his long, convoluted trip through the criminal justice system.330 He
was sentenced to death twice-his first sentence was set aside because of
comments the prosecutor had made about appellate review-and numer-
ous petitions for rehearing, post-conviction relief, and writs of habeas
corpus failed.33' In June 2003, Wiley filed a successive application for an
Atkins hearing.332 In August 2004, three months after it decided Chase, the
Mississippi Supreme Court denied Wiley's application, characterizing it as
"without merit. ' 333 It decided that this would be one of those times when
it would exercise the discretion the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction
Relief Act grants.334
Justice Easley wrote for the majority, and Presiding Justice Cobb au-
thored a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which Justice Dickinson joined. The court gave various reasons for deny-
ing Wiley's application. For one thing, it was technically deficient. It did
not assert that Wiley had taken the MMPI as required by Foster.3 3 5 Moreo-
ver, Wiley's IQ had been tested several times-in 1987, 1994, and 2003.
While the most recent results put his Full Scale IQ336 at sixty-eight, well
under the cutoff point of seventy-five established by Chase for mental re-
tardation, the court attached some significance to the fact that in 1994 the
number was eighty-three. Another factor perhaps influencing the decision
involved the credentials of Dr. Daniel Grant, Wiley's expert witness. The
state produced a magazine article attacking the legitimacy of one of the
organizations from which Grant received certification.337
But the decisive consideration seems to have been Wiley's alleged
abilities. The state said that he was "was a good husband [and] father...
that he was a good, reliable worker with steady employment ... that he
329. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 892-93.
330. The recounting of the procedural history as told by Justice Easley occupies more than an
entire page of the reporter. Id. at 893-94.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 894.
333. Id.
334. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-27(7) (2002 & Supp. 2004); see Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 894, 896-97,
898 (Cobb, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that in certain cases the court may
be able to resolve the question of mental retardation without ordering a hearing).
335. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 897-98. On the MMPI, consult supra notes 139-40 and accompanying
text.
336. The Wechsler test (WAIS-Ill in this instance) assigns separate IQ scores to various parts of
the test and then converts them to an overall IQ score called the Full Scale IQ. Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002).
337. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 896. The source of the article was not identified in this opinion, but
according to Justice Waller's opinion in Hughes v. State, another case in which Dr. Grant was involved,
it was from the February 2000 edition of the American Bar Association's eJournal. Hughes v. State,
892 So. 2d 203, 215 (Miss. 2004). Justice Dickinson, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Hughes,
rebutted this attack on Grant's qualifications and reminded his colleagues that "[miagazine articles are
seldom accepted by this Court as authority." Id. at 219-20.
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performed household maintenance, repaired automobiles, babysat chil-
dren, ran errands, supported his family and did numerous other things. Wi-
ley was also in the Army until injuring his leg and getting honorably
discharged." '338 The court adopted the state's characterization of the evi-
dence of Wiley's abilities:
These reports, affidavits and testimonies do not paint the
picture of a retarded person. Simply because retarded peo-
ple do not operate heavy machinery, retarded people do not
drive tractors, retarded people do not hold jobs for much
longer than a year at a time, much less work two jobs at a
time, retarded people are not admitted to the radio operator
school of the Army, retarded people do not get drivers li-
censes, buy cars and drive cars. [sic] Further, retarded peo-
ple do not support families and see to it that all the bills are
paid, retarded people do not see to the care of others and
make sure they have enough money, a nice house, and
school clothes. [sic]3 39
Writing in a later opinion, Justice Waller confirmed that the court
found this recital of Wiley's alleged abilities persuasive. "This Court found
Grant's affidavit in [Wiley's] case insufficient to warrant an evidentiary
hearing [in part] because . . . the record indicated that Wiley possessed
significant adaptive skills, i.e., sustained employment, military service, and
school attendance without special education classes."3"
In denying Wiley's application, the court found "it necessary to expand
on the procedure" prescribed in Chase and to hold that henceforth it would
"consider the entire record before it in deciding whether to grant an Atkins
hearing. '"341 Wiley's attorneys were taken aback by the sudden change.3"2
Now it might not be enough for an applicant to comply with the rules of
Chase-producing a qualified expert's affidavit attesting that the appli-
cant's IQ was below seventy-six and that further testing would likely con-
firm a diagnosis of mental retardation.343 Henceforth the court might
consider evidence from twenty-year-old proceedings.
Significantly, Justice Dickinson, the author of Chase, joined the opin-
ion written by Presiding Justice Cobb objecting to the supreme court's end
run around the trial court.34" Justice Cobb did not take issue with the new
rule about considering the entire record.3 45 Nor did she disagree with the
proposition that in some cases the court could resolve the issue without
338. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 896.
339. Id. at 897.
340. Hughes, 892 So. 2d at 215 (citing Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 896).
341. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 897.
342. Interview with Robert B. McDuff, attorney for William Wiley, in Jackson, Miss. (Feb. 2,
2005).
343. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1029-30 (Miss. 2004).
344. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 898-900 (Cobb, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
345. Id. at 898 (Cobb, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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granting a hearing in the trial court.346 She thought, however, that this was
not one of them.347 She wrote, "In essence, the majority abandons our
carefully written standards and procedures set forth in Chase v. State...
and goes too far in substituting the Court's evaluation of the evidence and
determination that Wiley is not mentally retarded[ ] for the evaluation and
determination to the contrary by professional psychologists ... 348
B. Hughes v. State
Another case in which the Mississippi Supreme Court decided that the
applicant was not retarded and denied a hearing was Hughes v. State.
349
In the opening paragraph of the section on mental retardation in
Hughes, Presiding Justice Waller quotes a somewhat ambiguous sentence
from Atkins: "Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so
impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about
whom there is a national consensus."35 Does this mean that some people
are impaired-slightly impaired-but not impaired enough to be exempt
from the death penalty under Atkins? Is being impaired (even if only
slightly) the same as being mentally retarded (even if only slightly)? If so,
perhaps the Mississippi Supreme Court was incorrect in Chase where it
analyzed the language of the Atkins majority and dissenting opinions to
reach the conclusion that "Atkins exempts all mentally retarded persons-
even those who are minimally mentally retarded-from execution .... "351
It made a very good case for this reading of Atkins. Now, in Hughes, it
backtracked. It compared William Hughes to William Wiley, whom the
court called "only borderline mentally retarded." '3 5 2 Even though Hughes
"technically complied with the requirements for a[ ] . . . hearing," '353 the
court judged him, like Wiley, as not within the category of "so impaired as
to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is
a national consensus. '35 4 He would not be allowed to try to convince the
trial judge otherwise.
Justice Dickinson, the author of Chase, wrote separately to concur in
part and dissent in part.3 55 Presiding Justice Cobb joined that opinion.3 56
346. Id. (Cobb, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
347. Id. (Cobb, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
348. Id. (Cobb, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
349. Hughes v. State, 892 So. 2d 203 (Miss. 2004).
350. Id. at 213 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002)).
351. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1026 (Miss. 2004). Dissenting in Atkins, Justice Scalia wrote,
"[Tihe Court concludes that no one who is even slightly mentally retarded can have sufficient moral
responsibility to be subjected to capital punishment for any crime." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
339 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 863-64 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
352. Hughes, 892 So. 2d at 215.
353. Id. at 216.
354. Id. at 213 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317).
355. Id. at 217-23.
356. Id.
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C. Smith v. State
Wiley and Hughes are hard to reconcile with Smith v. State,35 7 decided
on the same day as Chase. The Mississippi Supreme Court had ruled at his
direct appeal that Clyde Smith did not have mental retardation.358 Then, in
the May 2004 post-conviction relief proceeding, it granted an Atkins
hearing:
Notwithstanding the dearth of evidence which is before this
Court regarding Smith's claim of mental retardation, we de-
termine that under Atkins and Chase, we cannot constitu-
tionally deny him the opportunity to present the issue of his
possible mental retardation to the trial court. It is at the
trial court that all the arguments presented by the State as
well as those of Smith shall be heard and be weighed in ac-
cord with Chase, and a final determination made as to
whether Smith is mentally retarded and, thus, ineligible for
the death penalty.359
D. Who Decides?
The principle that the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing
and decide the issue of mental retardation was the essence of Justice Dick-
inson's dissent in Hughes.360  He was personally unpersuaded that
Hughes's conviction should be vacated; in fact, he agreed with the major-
ity's analysis of the issues in Hughes's application.361 (He also disclosed
that he disagrees with the majority opinion in Atkins and would have sided
with the dissenters.) 362 Nonetheless, he forcefully maintained that the su-
preme court was "constitutionally required to order the circuit court to
hold a hearing and make the determination." '363 The majority had "errone-
ously cho[sen] to become a finder of fact and decide" whether Hughes was
mentally retarded.3 64 He stated his belief that "except in unusual and lim-
ited circumstances (none of which are present here), this Court does not sit
as a finder of fact, but as an appellate court of limited jurisdiction. 3 65
E. An Inescapable Problem
A wrong decision in an Atkins case will have tragic consequences, ob-
viously. Society, the U.S. Supreme Court said in Atkins, has decided that it
357. Smith v. State, 877 So. 2d 369 (Miss. 2004).
358. Id. at 398.
359. Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
360. Hughes, 892 So. 2d at 217-22 (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
361. Id. at 217 (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
362. Id. at 218 (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
363. Id. (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
364. Id. (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
365. Id. (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 146;
Brown v. Sutton, 121 So. 835 (Miss. 1929)).
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is an affront to human dignity to execute a person with mental retardation.
Even one such mistake is serious, and great care must be taken to avoid it.
The two cases discussed above, however, highlight an inescapable problem
with implementing Atkins. Judges-including supreme court justices-are
not trained mental health professionals. They are laypeople in this context,
and there is danger when laypeople make life-or-death decisions based on
judgments as complex and fraught as whether someone has mental
retardation.
This problem is illustrated by Justice Waller's apparent conflation of
mental illness and mental retardation in Hughes. In the section of the opin-
ion discussing mental retardation, he quoted a psychiatrist who said that
"William R. Hughes is not mentally ill . . . .""366 The opinion also relates
the findings of a psychologist who reported that Hughes was not suffering
from a "severe mental illness." '36 7 But mental illness and mental retarda-
tion are two different things. As Professors Martha A. Field and Valerie A.
Sanchez, experts on law and mental retardation, explain:
Mental retardation is not a disease or a mental illness; nor is
it caused by mental illness. Mental retardation and mental
illness are distinct phenomena; persons may have both con-
ditions, but either can exist alone. Frequently, people with
mental illness-schizophrenia or depression, for example-
are intellectually high-functioning but emotionally damaged
or disordered. Conversely, persons with retardation are
often emotionally "normal" but intellectually low-function-
ing.... Although mental illness and retardation are differ-
ent, posing quite different problems and calling for different
solutions, both law and society have sometimes regarded
the two conditions fungibly.3
68
Justice Dickinson recognized this distinction in his opinion in Hughes:
"'[M]entally ill' does not mean 'mentally retarded."' 369 Whether he is typi-
cal of judges in his understanding of the nuances of mental health is uncer-
tain, although, considering the evidence at hand, it seems unlikely.
F. The Challenges of Assessing Mental Retardation
In Wiley, the majority accepted the state's contentions about the capa-
bilities of people with mental retardation, which led them to reject Wiley's
Atkins claim because of his accomplishments. 370 But the state's notions
about the capabilities of people with mental retardation are mistaken.
Adopting them, Justice Easley wrote that "retarded people do not operate
366. Hughes, 892 So. 2d at 214.
367. Id. at 215.
368. MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION 23-24 (1999).
369. Hughes, 892 So. 2d at 219 (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
370. Wiley v. State, 890 So. 2d 892, 896-97 (Miss. 2004). See supra Section V.A.
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heavy machinery [or] drive tractors [or] hold jobs for much longer than a
year at a time .... ."371 He asserted that "retarded people do not support
families [or] see to the care of others and make sure they have enough
money, a nice house, and school clothes.
372
But consider the example of Donna and Ricardo Thornton. They both
have mild mental retardation. 73 In 1984 they married, and two years later
they had a son, Ricardo Jr.3 74 In 2002, the elder Mr. Thornton was the
recipient of the District of Columbia Mayor's Community Service
Award.375 His list of accomplishments would be impressive for anyone
without mental retardation. He
serves as co-president of Project Action, a coalition of local
self-advocacy groups that represents the interests of individ-
uals with developmental disabilities. He is on the District's
Developmental Disabilities State Planning Council and on
the boards of University Legal Services and Positive Alter-
natives for Family Advisory Committee. He has worked in
the Martin Luther King, Jr. Library for over 23 years. Addi-
tionally, he has been extremely active in the Special Olym-
pics, even traveling to South Africa to serve as an
ambassador for Special Olympics International.376
The Washingtonian Magazine named Thornton "Washingtonian of the
Year" in 1997, an honor he shares with William 0. Douglas, Barbara Bush,
and Eleanor Holmes Norton, among others.37 7
Contrary to Justice Easley's statement that persons with mental retar-
dation cannot support and care for families and maintain nice homes, the
Thorntons raised their son and provided for him in a "two-bedroom town
house [that] is spacious.378 Little Ricky's room is filled with toys; a rocking
chair, where Donna Thornton cradles her son[;] and a small black and
white television set."
379
While Ricardo Thornton's prodigious record of achievement surely
represents an exception among people with mental retardation, eighty-nine
percent of all persons with mental retardation "can usually acquire the vo-
cational and social skills necessary for independent living.
38 °
371. Wiley, 890 So. 2d at 897.
372. Id.
373. Patrice Gaines-Carter, Retarded Parents Celebrate Rare Joy, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,1987, at B1.
374. Id.
375. Government of the District of Columbia, Serve DC: Mayor's Community Service Award-
Ricardo Thornton, at http://www.cncs.dc.gov/cncs/cwp/view,a,1194,q,493489.asp (last accessed Feb. 5,
2006).
376. Id.
377. Washingtonian Online, List of Previous Washingtonians of the Year, at http://
www.washingtonian.com/people/woy/previouswinners.html (last accessed Feb. 5, 2006).
378. Gaines-Carter, supra note 373.
379. Gaines-Carter, supra note 373.
380. FIELD, supra note 368, at 32.
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The Thorntons' lives dramatically illustrate the potential dangers when
judges-or anyone else other than trained mental health professionals-
make decisions about who does and who does not have mental retardation.
The procedure for making that determination laid out by the Mississippi
Supreme Court in Chase may well provide the minimum safeguard against
judges making incorrect decisions based upon mistaken notions about
mental retardation. When such procedures are abandoned, as in Wiley and
Hughes, justice is denied.
The danger is compounded by the behavior known as the "cloak of
competence." 38 ' People with impairments tend to try to mask them by, for
example, hiding their inability to read or to do basic arithmetic. 382 They
may take menial jobs that do not require conceptual skills.383 As a result,
sometimes even defense lawyers do not realize that their clients have
mental retardation, and prosecutors, jurors, and judges may discount the
significance of evidence. 384 "They see a defendant who is not manifestly
'crazy,' and they do not grasp the profound yet subtle ways a person with
retardation is limited in his or her capacity to understand the world around
him or her and to act appropriately. ' 385 Needless to say, these mispercep-
tions can impede accurate decision-making about mental retardation.
Various degrees of mental retardation exist, as do several labeling
schemes. The designers of the Wechsler IQ tests devised a classification
scheme that categorizes people as having "mild retardation," "moderate
retardation," "severe retardation," and "profound retardation. '386 These
labels have fallen out of fashion to some degree, and newer schemes speak
of "low average," "appreciably subaverage," and "markedly subaverage,"
for example.387 But the cases make extensive use of the Wechsler terminol-
ogy and the APA diagnostic manual retains it.
388
Even though a person in the mild category may appear normal and
function normally in many respects, she nonetheless has mental
retardation.
Persons with mild mental retardation may be hard to iden-
tify, often being physically indistinguishable from the typical
population. In school, they are capable of learning aca-
demic skills up to approximately a sixth grade level, and, as
adults, they can usually acquire the vocational and social
381. Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental Retardation, ABA Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilites, at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summerO1/fellner.html (last ac-





386. FIELD, supra note 368, at 32.
387. FIELD, supra note 368, at 32.
388. Mossman, supra note 140, at 266.
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skills necessary for independent living. Of all persons with
mental retardation, 89% are mildly retarded.
389
Mental retardation is not a neatly circumscribed category with rigid
boundaries, nor is it a disease that health professionals can always confi-
dently diagnose.39 ° Identifying mental retardation turns out to be less than
a straightforward, mechanical exercise.391 Recent developments in the case
of Darryl Atkins, the man whose appeals led to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision outlawing execution of people with mental retardation, illustrate
just how slippery the boundary between mental retardation and "nor-
malcy" can be.
Because the Court did not decide whether Atkins had mental retarda-
tion-it left this determination up to state courts in all such cases-Atkins
had another trial in the summer of 2005.392 The jury found that he did not
have mental retardation and resentenced him to death.393 His attorneys
have filed notice of appeal and the case likely will be heard by the Virginia
Supreme Court in 2006. 39' Atkins's lawyers contend
that the trial .. .was tainted when the judge gave jurors
information about Atkins's previous conviction and told
them Atkins had already been given a death sentence.
[They also argue] that Virginia's law on mental retardation
is constitutionally flawed. The law, passed after the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruling, violates due process rights . . . [and]
places the burden of proof on the defendant and fails to out-
line procedural issues, including whether to probe jurors for
their opinions about the death penalty and what would hap-
pen in the case of a hung jury.3 95
These concerns mirror problems alleged by attorneys representing clients
facing Atkins hearings in Mississippi.
3 96
In an ironic turn of events, it appears that Atkins's IQ may have gone
up during the many years he has spent in the structured environment of
prison. As a result, he may no longer qualify for exemption from execution
under Atkins. According to Evan Nelson, a psychologist who examined
Atkins and testified for the defense, "Oddly enough .. .because of his
constant contact with the many lawyers [who] worked on his case... Mr.
Atkins received more intellectual stimulation in prison than he did during
389. FIELD, supra note 368, at 32.
390. See Mossman, supra note 140, at 264-72.
391. Mossman, supra note 140, at 264-72.
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his late adolescence and early adulthood." '397 He "practiced reading and
writing, learned about abstract legal concepts and communicated with pro-
fessionals. 39 8 He "was in a single cell with little more than a television for
company, and his favorite show was the History Channel, creating a forced
march towards increased mental stimulation." '399 All of which sounds like a
good thing-should not society want offenders to improve intellectually
during incarceration? But in Atkins's case, improvement may mean death.
The mere passage of time, too, can increase one's IQ. On average, IQs
tend to rise by about three points a decade.4°°
One of the prosecutors in the Atkins case, Eileen M. Addison, exhib-
ited the same misunderstanding of mental retardation evident in Hughes.
Addison said that Atkins's "ability to load and work a gun, to recognize an
A.T.M. card, to direct [his victim] to withdraw money and to identify a
remote area for the killing all proved that Mr. Atkins is not retarded. 4 °1
As discussed above, that conclusion does not necessarily follow. People
with mental retardation are often able to do many things, especially those
with "mild" mental retardation.
The judge who will preside over Atkins's hearing provides another ex-
ample of a layperson lacking a sophisticated understanding of mental retar-
dation yet forced by circumstances to act in a situation where such an
understanding is crucial. Referring to the various considerations, some of
them ambiguous, with which the jury will have to grapple, the judge said,
"The issues [that will determine whether Atkins has mental retardation]
are bright lights and targeted with a bull's-eye. '4°2 Atkins's attorneys dis-
agreed. "For people real close to the edge, there is nothing easy about
that," said Richard Burr, one of the lawyers representing Atkins.40 3 "There
is going to be controverted evidence, subject to sharp disputes and
disagreements."
4 4
Assessing mental retardation presents such a complex challenge that
leading mental health professionals have serious concerns about the way
Atkins is playing out in the courts. For example, Dr. Douglas Mossman,
Professor and Director of the Division of Forensic Psychiatry at Wright
State University School of Medicine and Adjunct Professor at the Univer-
sity of Dayton School of Law, sees fundamental problems. He is concerned
that "Atkins may only add a new layer of complexity and confusion to the
already capricious process through which the U.S. criminal justice system
imposes death sentences.
'40 5
397. Donna St. George, A Question of Culpability; Mental Capacity of Convicted Virginia Man Is a
Murky Legal Issue, WASH. POST, July 23, 2005, at Al.
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G. The Use of Diagnostic Tools in the Courtroom
Central to Mossman's reservations is the very nature of the diagnostic
tools that are being pressed into service in the criminal justice system.4"6
The definitions of mental retardation from the AAMR and APA manuals,
Mossman points out, were designed to aid in treatment of mental disor-
ders.4" 7 He distinguishes "utility" from "validity"; the tools are useful to
clinicians and social workers in the therapeutic setting, but whether they
are valid as accurate descriptors is another matter.4 °8 Imported into the
courts, they may not be very meaningful. The result could be arbitrary
reliance on standards that do not have much to do with reality.
"[T]he diagnosis of mental retardation-despite its clinical useful-
ness-is an entirely artificial construct: the line that separates persons who
receive this diagnosis from individuals whose mental capacities are only
well below average is a changing and arbitrary one. '4 °9 Changing indeed:
the AAMR has "updated" its definition of mental retardation, on average,
every ten years.410 The most recent changes were published five days
before Atkins, in the tenth edition of the AAMR diagnostic manual.411
The Court took the definition in Atkins, however, from the ninth edition.412
Underlying the courtroom use of these definitions is the assumption
that they are objective and at least somewhat precise indicators. But Moss-
man points out that
the numbers that IQ tests generate are far from being per-
fectly reliable measurements of a person's cognitive ability.
Under the best conditions, IQ tests have a "measurement
error" of about five points .... Another source of uncer-
tainty stems from the fact that, for many items, the test ad-
ministrator has to decide how many points a subject's
response deserves. In normal clinical use, these imperfec-
tions do not matter a great deal. When testing a defendant
for whom a one- or two-point change in IQ score has life-
and-death implications, however, clinicians may have a hard
time being dispassionately "objective" . . . . If IQ testing
generates nettlesome problems with imprecision and mea-
surement error, measuring adaptive functioning-a key fea-
ture defining mental retardation-is even trickier.413
These problems prompted the American Psychiatric Association to in-
clude a "Cautionary Statement" in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
406. See generally Mossman, supra note 140.
407. Mossman, supra note 140, at 264-65.
408. Mossman, supra note 140, at 264-65.
409. Mossman, supra note 140, at 265 (footnote omitted).
410. Mossman, supra note 140, at 265.
411. Mossman, supra note 140, at 265.
412. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 (2002).
413. Mossman, supra note 140, at 269-70 n.3.
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Mental Disorders, warning that the purpose of the manual "is to provide
clear descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to enable clinicians and
investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat people with
various mental disorders. The clinical and scientific considerations in-
volved in categorization of these conditions as mental disorders may not be
wholly relevant to legal judgments . "..."414 This manual, as described
above, is the source of one of the definitions of mental retardation in At-
kins,415 the definition that the Mississippi Supreme Court preferred in Fos-
ter v. State, early in the process of deciding how to implement Atkins.416
H. Implications for the Future
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that mental retardation is
not a real phenomenon or that it should not be a factor in deciding on a fair
and just disposition of a criminal case. It should be; the problem is in the
application of the principle, the assessing of the condition. In the wake of
Atkins, Dr. Renee Binder, chair of the American Psychiatric Association's
Committee on Judicial Action, asserted that Atkins "recognizes that there
are objective and reliable determinations of whether an individual has
mental retardation when the assessment is done by qualified professionals
with substantial experience. ' '4 17 But Mossman has raised issues that call
into question whether even "qualified professionals with substantial experi-
ence" can make meaningful determinations in all, or even most, cases in-
volving the death penalty.
Perhaps, ultimately, the only way to safeguard the moral principle put
forth in Atkins-the only way to certainly avoid executing people with
mental retardation-is to avoid executing people altogether.
Mossman subtitled his article A Psychiatric Can of Worms.4 18 The
point of that title is that the rationale undergirding Atkins should require
exempting from the death penalty those who have the same kinds of defi-
cits as those with mental retardation, but whose deficits are due to other
causes. 419 Mental retardation causes-sometimes, in some people-poor
control of impulses, and the inability to connect actions with consequences
and so be deterred by the prospect of punishment. And so do many other
mental disorders-sometimes, in some people.420 Logic and fairness dic-
tate treating sufferers of those disorders the same as people with mental
retardation vis-A-vis capital punishment.
Mossman argues that the list of conditions that logically might afford
Atkins-style exemptions includes:
414. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 119, at xxxvii.
415. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3.
416. Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172, 175 (Miss. 2003).
417. Ken Hausman, Court Bars Execution of Mentally Retarded Criminals, 37 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS
1 (July 19, 2002) available at http://www.pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/37/14/1-a.
418. Mossman, supra note 140.
419. See Mossman, supra note 140, at 278-89.
420. See Mossman, supra note 140, at 278-89.
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* Cognitive disorders acquired after childhood-mental deteriora-
tion from brain-damaging events such as head injuries, infections,
drug abuse, and Alzheimer's disease
42
* Schizophrenia-200 or more schizophrenics live on the country's
death rows.422
* Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)-Despite a
widespread perception that this is not a "real" condition, most psy-
chiatrists think it is and that it can cause inability to control im-
pulses and to conform to rules.423
* Low central nervous system serotonin function-Low brain seroto-
nin levels can lead to spontaneous, impulsive aggression and a ten-




* Pervasive developmental disorders426
* Intermittent explosive disorder4 27
* Antisocial personality disorder
428
* Post-traumatic stress disorder 42
9
VI. CONCLUSION
On March 1, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Roper v. Sim-
mons, holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the exe-
cution of offenders who were under the age of eighteen when they
committed their crimes.430 The parallels with Atkins are striking. Again
the Court revisited an aspect of death-penalty jurisprudence on which it
had ruled in 1989.43 1 Again the Court overruled its earlier decision.432
Again the Court considered the national consensus represented by legisla-
tion, the diminished culpability of the class in question, and the penological
justifications for the death penalty.43 3 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and
the Missouri Supreme Court, whose judgment Roper affirmed, relied heav-
ily on Atkins and discussed it at length in their opinions.434
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The Roper decision-and simple logic-support Dr. Mossman's specu-
lation that the time may not be distant when the courts decide that "suffer-
ers of several mental disorders deserve the same constitutional protections
that Atkins confers upon defendants with mental retardation. Given the
high rate of serious mental illness among homicide defendants, granting
psychiatric exemptions would leave very few individuals eligible for the
death penalty." '435 A high percentage of the residents of the nation's death
rows have serious mental impairments.436 The conclusion is inescapable:
the ultimate mark of progress of this maturing society will be when it de-
cides that its evolving standards of decency require ending the miscarriage
of justice that is inevitable when it executes its most damaged, disturbed,
disadvantaged members. To accomplish that goal, it must decide that the
death penalty is unworkable and that it must be abandoned.
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